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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
---0000000---
BARBARA J. WARREN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
ROBERT L. WARREN, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
---0000000---
BRI EF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 17514 
This is a divorce action in which the plaintiff 
wife appeals from the property and debt distribution and 
alimony award entered by the trial judge, and from the trial 
court's failure to award attorney's fees. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Following an extensive pre-trial order and a 
two-day trial before the Honorable Peter F. Leary, a divorce 
was granted to the plaintiff wife. The husband was awarded 
58 percent of the parties' accumulated property and the 
balance was awarded to the wife. However, of the 42 percent 
of the marital estate awarded to the wife, 76 percent 
consists of personal property valued in accordance with the 
husband's statement. Of that property awarded to the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
husband, 72 percent consists of stocks valued according to 
national stock exchange quotations of the day of the trial 
and vested retirement funds. The husband was given a lien 
upon the home for his equity, which lien was to be paid in 
any event within six months of the decree of divorce, when 
the parties' eldest child graduated from high school. The 
wife was awarded alimony in the sum of $400 per month for a 
period of 48 months. The wife was ordered to assume and pa: 
72 percent of the marital obligations. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-appellant Barbara J. Warren respectful!; 
requests that this court remand the case for a new tritl ~ 
respect to the distribution of the property of the parties, 
the order for the payment of marital debts and obligations, 
for a reconsideration of a reasonable amount of alimony a~ 
the time period over which such alimony is to be paid ud t 
a consideration of the attorney'.s fees incurred by the 
plaintiff-appellant in the trial of this action and upoo 
appeal. Alternatively, plaintiff-appellant respectfully 
requests the Court to consider the evidence presented at tbE 
trial and contained within the record on appeal and to 
fashion its own award. 
2 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 21, 1979, plaintiff filed the complaint 
for divorce. Following extensive discovery and numerous 
appearances before the court, the action was tried before the 
Honorable Peter F. Leary on September 5, 1980, and 
September 11, 1980. By a memorandum decision of November 14, 
1980, the plaintiff-appellant, hereinafte~ "Mrs. Warren", was 
awarded a decree of divorce. In dividing the real and 
personal property of the parties, and in ordering the 
assumption and payment of marital liabilities, the trial 
court adopted without modification the proposed division of 
the marital estate and proposed division of the marital 
liabilities which had been presented by defendant-respondent, 
hereinafter "Mr. Warren". The trial court awarded additional 
personal property to Mr. Warren. Following a hearing on 
December 3, 1980, concerning the clarification of the court's 
memorandum decision, the decree of divorce was signed on 
December 16, and was entered on December 17, 1980. Custody 
of the one minor child of the parties was awarded to Mrs. 
Warren. During the pendency of this appeal, that child has 
graduated from high school and is now of majority. 
The parties were married in San Antonio, Texas, on 
June 27, 1952. At the time of the marriage, Mr. Warren had 
just completed his sophomore year of college. While he 
3 
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worked part-time for two months out of the year, he was a 
full-time student for nine months out of the year, and 
Mrs. Warren was the sole support of the family. ( Transcri; 
(Tr.) at 60-61; Record (R.) at 434-435.) Mr. Warren attena, 
Rice Institute in Houston, Texas for five years. Mrs, War:-
paid his expenses for that attendance and in addition 
provided support and maintenance as well as luxuries such 
1
, 
three sports cars. (Tr. 61; R. 435.) 
Following his graduation, Mr. Warren began~~~ 
for LCB in Dallas, Texas, the company now being known as 
E Systems. Mr. Warren--has worked for this company for 26 
years, during which time his income and benefits have 
increased dramatically. In the year before the divorce 
trial, 1979, Mr. Warren's gross income was $46,628. 
(Tr. 152; R. 520.) In that same year, Mrs. Warren's gross 
income from a legacy was $8,048.09. (Tr. 206; R. 580.) 
Mrs. Warren's independent source of income is a 
trust and bank stock acquired from her father prior to ~r 
marriage. The principal of her legacy was, at the time~ 
trial, approximately $97,500. Despite the extreme 
differences in their income, Mrs. Warren's legacy was, 
many times during the marriage, depleted in order to pay tbe 
income tax liabilities of the parties. (Tr. 154; R. 528.) 
4 
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In April of 1977, when Barbara's income was $10,200, $4,300 
was applied to an Internal Revenue Service bill. (Tr. 161; 
K. 535.) Mr. Warren, incredibly, testified that of the 1979 
$5,200 tax obligation, one-half of the obligation is 
attributable to Mrs. Warren's income dividends and interest. 
(Tr. 185-186; R. 559-560.) From the principal of the trust, 
$146,599.10 was contributed to the marriage (Tr. 57; R. 
431.) 
Mrs. Warren testified that the legacy was used for 
family expenses because Mr. Warren refused to provide for the 
family. (Tr. 59; R. 433.) In the years immediately prior to 
the divorce, pleas that Mr. Warren contribute to the expenses 
of the family produced only feeble responses. Mr. Warren's 
contributions sunk to the paltry sum of $450 during one of 
these years. It fell upon Mrs. Warren to pay the children's 
living expenses, dental bills and educational expenses. (Tr. 
71; R. 445.) 
The trial court found that Mrs. Warren, who is 49 
years of age, is "capable of being employed although she has 
never been employed, has no skills and is suffering from 
medical problem [sic) relating to her hands." This 
assumption, clearly inconsistent with recognized facts, 
5 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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resulted in Mrs. Warren being awarded alimony of $400 per 
month for a 48-month period. 
According to Mr. Warren, the personal property 
either inherited by Mrs. Warren or awarded to her by the 
decree of divorce is worth $161,000. (Tr. 180; R. 554.) 
This value, which was accepted by the court in its decree:: 
divorce, is without foundation. Even the appraiser of llie 
property, Thomas A. Olsen, a witness for the defendant, 
stated that be bad spent little better than an hour in hls 
appraisal of the personal property in the home and that thi' 
was insufficient time to perform a valid or satisfactory 
appraisal. (Tr. 15; R. 389.) Values of specific items of 
property declared by Mr. Warren are on their face 
speculative. For example, in defendant's Exhibit 21-D, 
Mr. Warren values china and art objects at $17,000 and a 
large oil painting at $2,500. Yet Mr. Warren had no 
recollection of the name of the painter, did not itemize th< 
art objects and offered no foundation for this value other 
than his estimate of the replacement value of the property. 
The value of the personal property ultimately 
awarded to Mrs. Warren was in fact an estimate of replaceme: 
value, without any rel a ti on to the actual market value of t: 
property. (See testimony of Thomas A. Olsen, Tr. 22; R. 39i 
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Testimony of William C. McConabay, Tr. 30; R. 404; Testimony 
of Carl G. Walberg, Tr. 38; R. 412.) 
In addition to bis substantial income, Mr. Warren 
acquired a substantial interest in stock. Valued according 
to the figures quoted by tbe Wall Street Journal on tbe day 
before tbe trial, Mr. Warren owned $73,840.50 of currently 
traded marketable stock. Furthermore, be bad a pension plan 
with a present value of $20,247 and a future value estimated 
by Mr. Warren at $51,000. (Tr. 193; R. 567.) During the 
marriage, Mr. Warren developed a capability to earn a 
substantial income (he ·estimated that he had made 
approximately $500,000 in his lifetime), a capability which 
remained with him at the time of the decree of divorce. 
On the other hand, Mrs. Warren, who contributed to 
the marriage approximately $300,000 from the principal and 
interest of her legacy, was at the time of the decree of 
divorce and according to the judge's findings, not employed, 
without skills, and suffering from a medical problem related 
to her hands. She is left with a depleted inheritance with 
a greatly reduced value for generation of future income. The 
decrease in the value of the trust was directly related to 
her support of the marriage. It was for the purchase of the 
second marital home that money was withdrawn from the 
7 
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principal of her inheritance. (Tr 58 · R 432 ) M 
• , • · oney wa, 
also withdrawn to pay for the day-to-day living expenses ~ 
the family and to provide family necessities such as mect· lea. 
care (Tr. 71; R. 445). This same legacy conveniently 
provided Mr. Warren with an educ a ti on which permitted him!. 
substantially increase his own earning capacity and provide: 
him with luxuries in life. (Tr. 60; R. 434.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND WAS 
MISTAKEN AS TO THE APPLI-CABLE LAW IN THE DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
A. The standard for this court's review of 
the decree of divorce. 
This court has on innumerable occasions held that 
divorce action is equitable in nature and that the ruling o' 
a trial judge is favored with a presumption of propriety anc 
accuracy. This court has also held that it can review 
questions of both law and fact. King v. King, 25 Utah~ 
163, 478 P. 2d 492 ( 1970); appeal after remand 27 Utah 2d 30o 
495 P.2d 823. Though they are favored, findings, judgments 
and decrees of the trial court are still subject to review 
for the trial court's discretion is not without limitation. 
DeRose v. DeRose, 19 Utah 2d 77, 426 P.2d 221 (1967). Shoui: 
8 
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the trial court fail to correctly apply principles of law or 
equity, or should evidence clearly preponderate against a 
finding, or should a judgment or decree so fail to do equity 
that a clear abuse of discretion is manifested, then this 
Court will take the appropriate corrective action necessary. 
Watson v. Watson, 561 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1977). When such error 
has occurred, the Supreme Court may review the evidence and 
make its own findings and may substitute its judgment for 
that of the trial court when the ends of justice so require. 
Harding v. Harding, 26 Utah 2d 277, 488 P.2d 308 (1971). 
On appeal, thts court may review a case, weigh 
evidence and may substitute its judgment for that of the 
trial court. Graziano v. Graziano, 7 Utah 2d 187, 321 F.2d 
931 (1958). If after such a review it is found that the 
decree works an injustice contrary to equity and conscience, 
this court may revise the decree. Christensen v. 
Christensen, 21 Utah 2d 263, 444 P.2d 511 (1968). 
B. The trial court abused its discretion by 
awarding an unwarranted majority of the property to 
Mr. Warren. 
The trial court adopted, without modification, the 
proposed distribution of the marital property submitted on 
behalf of the defendant. Defendant's Exhibit 31-D. In so 
9 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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doing, the court adopted the property or asset values whl: 
had been stipulated to by the parties or which were 
Mr. Warren's estimate. Mr. Warren's stated values grossly 
exaggerate the actual value of the property awarded to 
Mrs. Warren, particularly when compared to the actual value 
of the property awarded to Mr. Warren. 
Within the pre-trial order, Mr. Warren agre~ ~~ 
the legacy left to Mrs. Warren, which she had acquired ~K 
to the marriage, was to remain the personal property of 
Mrs. Warren. This legacy had a value of approximately 
$97, 500 and had in prir:reipal been reduced during the marria;. 
by approximately $146, 500. The reduction of the principal 
had been utilized for the benefit of the marriage and in 
support of the family. (Tr. 57; R. 431; Tr. 59; R. 433.) 
From the marital estate, Mrs. Warren was awarded one-half~ 
the agreed upon equity in the home or $23, 500. The balance 
of the marital estate awarded to Mrs. Warren was comprised o: 
personal property valued on a replacement basis by the 
defendant or by experts chosen by the defendant. In 
particular, the one appraiser who testified, Thomas Olsen, 
stated that he had insufficient time in which to perform a 
valid or satisfactory appraisal. (Tr. 15; R. 389.) 
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On the otherhand, the portion of the marital estate 
awarded to Mr. Warren was substantially liquid and growth 
oriented or income producing. Mr. Warren was awarded stocks 
traded on the major exchanges and valued at the time of the 
divorce action at $45.75 per share; he was also awarded a 
retirement fund with a present value of over $20,000 and a 
future value of $51,000. In addition, Mr. Warren was 
permitted to retain a substantial amount of his current 
income having been ordered to pay only $400 per month for a 
period of 48 months as alimony. 
The trial court's misunderstanding of the value of 
the property may be found in the internal inconsistencies in 
the defendant's own testimony and that of his experts with 
respect to the value. The defendant offered replacement 
value estimates or estimates of value without any reasonable 
foundation, for example his estimate of the value of a 
painting. (Tr. 246; R. 620.) In the pre-trial order, 
Mrs. Warren was ordered to provide supporting documentation 
reflecting purchase dates, costs, and present value of those 
items of personal property located within the home. Later, 
at trial, the court expressed its intention to have the 
property of the parties appraised. (Tr. 249; R. 623.) 
However, this appraisal was apparently never performed, and 
11 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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the document presented by Mrs. Warren pursuant to the 
pre-trial order, Exhibit 5-P, was ignored by the court. ~ 
values accepted by the trial court were contrary to 
statements made by Mrs. Warren that the appraisals submitte: 
by Mr. Warren were grossly exaggerated. (Tr. 73; R. 447; !: 
146; R. 520.) Mrs. Warren's former counsel never elicited 
from her a valuation of the property. 
In Read v. Read, 594 P. 2d 871 (Utah 1979), the 
court recognized that the discretion afforded the trial ~~ 
in allocating property and financial resources is not witho. 
limit. In that case, a-pproxima tely 90 percent of the assets 
accumulated by the parties during a 25-year marriage were i 
awarded to the plaintiff wife. This court stated the purpoi'' 
of a property settlement should not be to impose punish~M 
upon either party. Rather, the court is to consider many 
factors in making a property settlement in a divorce 
proceeding bearing in mind the ultimate goal of arrangiq~ 
best possible allocation of the property and the economk 
resources of the parties so that the parties can pursue t~t 
lives in as happy and useful a manner as possible. 
If it appears that the decree is so 
discordant with an equitable 
allocation that it will more likely 
lead to further difficulties and 
distress than to serve the desired 
12 
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objective, then a reappraisal of the 
decree must be undertaken. 
594 P.2d at 872. In Read v. Read, the court recognized the 
inconsistencies and unresolved questions in the trial record 
regarding the values of property and as a consequence 
remanded the case to the trial court for a further hearing 
concerning the nature and extent of the parties assets and 
liabilities. In particular, the court questioned the value 
of an unimproved parcel of real property at $60,000 when the 
only credible evidence concerning its value indicated it to 
be worth $30,000 and $35,000. 
Similar inconsistencies and unresolved questions 
may be found in the trial of the action now before the court. 
Even the trial court questioned the accuracy of the estimates 
of the value of personal property and indicated the need for 
an objective appraisal of the property. Such questions of 
the accuracy of the value of the property arises naturally 
when one sees estimates of $17,000 for art objects that are 
not enumerated, or values of paintings without any reference 
to the artist. Questions also arise concerning the valuation 
of jewelry at $19,886 without any evidence whatsoever of the 
present market or actual value of such jewelry. 
In Exhibit 16-D received from the defendant, a 
statement is made by an appraiser that the personal contents 
13 
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of the home were worth a minimum of $50, 000 on an immectiai. 
sale basis and had a retail replacement value of near 
$100,000. This appraisal was based upon a walk-through 01 
the home, which the appraiser himself testified was 
insufficient as the foundation for an accurate appraisal. 
The defendant then valued this property at $161,000, lliis 
final value being the one accepted by the court. The 
defendant agreed that Mrs. Warren be awarded $71,732 in 
inherited personal property and $44,240 in personal pro~~ 
acquired during the marriage. Mr. Warren also claimed 
(Exhibit 31-D) that his-valuation of the property awarded t: 
Mrs. Warren compared favorably with the property he desim 
to be awarded. This comparison is inaccurate in light of t: 
very different types of property; his is income-producing a1 
hers of little value to her support. 
When viewed without the taint of over-valued 
personal property, and considering only that portion cl t~ 
marital estate (exclusive of Mrs. Warren's legacy) comprisec 
of stocks, retirement plans and real property, Mr. Warrn~ 
awarded 84 percent of such property. It is this type of 
property distribution which has been found to be excessin 
and inequitable and one which results in the imposition of' 
14 
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penalty upon a party, in this case Mrs. Warren. (See, Read 
v. Read, supra.) 
An indication of the misunderstanding of 
Mrs. Warren's needs may be found in the court's statement 
with reference to Mrs. Warren that this was a case of "what I 
have is mine and what was acquired through the endeavors of 
my husband is ours." (Tr. 263; R. 637.) 
In Pope v. Pope, 589 P.2d 752 (Utah 1978), the 
court approved a distribution of the net value of property 
which gave 65 percent to the plaintiff wife and 35 percent to 
the defendant husband. -In response to the husband's claim 
that such a division was inequitable, the court pointed out 
that the defendant husband was awarded income-producing 
assets of the family. It was also noted that the defendant 
husband had two college degrees and several years experience 
in operating his businesses and thus was reasonably assured 
of future earnings and profits from his business activities. 
On the other hand, the plaintiff wife had no college 
education and was unemployed at the time of trial. The court 
had awarded her no alimony. 
The trial court's decree of divorce in this case is 
contrary to the equitable principle of Pope v. Pope, for it 
awards a substantial majority of the total property, almost 
15 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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all of the income-producing property and that which assure: 
future earnings, to the educated, experienced and employab: 
husband. The decree leaves little but grossly over-val~ 
personal property to the unemployable, uneducated wife -
mother of 29 years. 
It may be that the trial court misunderstood the 
nature of Mr. Warren's future income. The accepted propen 
distribution as submitted by the defendant, Exhibit 31-0, 
reflects a value of a retirement fund of $20,247 and of a 
stock option plan of $19,388, conditioned by defendant's 
statement that these were "assets realizable only upon 
retirement--not liquid." This was clearly a question in th: 
court's mind as the court requested a detailed explanation 
the pension plan. (Tr. 266; R. 640.) There is no evidence: 
in the record that this information was ever provided. 
Mr. Warren's own testimony suggests that Exhibit 31-D is no'. 
an accurate statement of the value of the pension plan a~ 
stock option plan either in the future or at the present. 
The following exchange occurred between the court and 
Mr. Warren (Tr. 253; R. 627): 
THE COURT: Mr. Warren, I have a couple 
of questions. In connection with 
your pension, if you were to die 
tomorrow, what would happen with 
your pension? 
16 
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MR. WARREN: It would revert to my heirs 
on an annuity basis, I think. 
THE COURT: Well, would it or wouldn't 
it? 
ANSWER: I'm not really sure. I've got 
somewhere the information on it. 
THE COURT: Well--. 
ANSWER: And it would revert to them I 
believe at that lump sum value of 
$50,000 rather than the discounted 
present value of $20,000. 
Contrary to his statement on Exhibit 31-D that the 
assets were realizable only upon retirement, Mr. Warren 
testified that the stocK option plan was available to him one 
year after separation from the company (Tr. 194; R. 568) and 
that he was 80 percent vested in the company-funded pension 
plan. 
What Mr. Warren was concerned about was the 
inclusion of his retirement fund at an accurate value into 
the marital estate. The propriety of the consideration of 
such a retirement fund as part of the assets available for 
distribution was upheld by this court in Ehninger v. 
Ehninger, 569 P.2d 1104 (Utah 1977). In that case, the 
dissatisfied husband contended that "the trial court erred in 
placing a value upon and making a division of • · • the 
defendant's profit sharing plan, the purpose of which [was] 
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r 
I 
for his retirement" and the benefit of which would be 
available to him only upon retirement. 569 P.2d at 11~. 
This court held that the inclusion of the husband's vested 
but not immediately available, interest in his retirement 
fund was appropriate. 569 P.2d at 1106. Moreover, th~ 
court recently upheld a property distribution which 
considered as a family asset the bus-band's accrued interes· 
in a retirement fund. In Englert v. Englert, 576 P.2d 12;; 
(Utah 1978), the husband contended that: 
His retirment fund is not "property" 
within the meaning of our statute and 
should not be-so considered in 
determining the rights of the parties 
under the divorce decree. He reasons 
that because that fund was accumulated as 
a result of his service and tenure, it is 
inequitable to permit [his wife) to 
participate therein. 
576 P.2d at 1275. 
This contention was rejected and this court 
approved the inclusion of the fund at its accrued value at 
the time of trial. The future value as testified to ~ 
Mr. Warren of $51, 000 was based upon a perhaps unrealistic 
8 percent interest rate. Such a low interest rate no d~M 
greatly undervalues the retirement fund. 
Throughout the trial, Mr. Warren made gratuitous 
statements in an attempt to convince the court of his 
18 
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impoverished condition and the wealth of his wife. In 
discussing his purchase of stock commencing in 1976, he 
stated "I had no estate whatever, because we had spent all of 
my income for all the years up until then, and I was planning 
for my retirement". (Tr. 190; R. 564.) In the same exchange 
with his counsel he admits that the company maintained a 
stock option retirement program and a company funded pension 
plan. Mr. Warren knew that Mrs. Warren had contributed 
heavily to the welfare and benefit of the household, had put 
him through school and that together they had amassed a 
significant estate, by liis figures worth over $150,000 in 
personal property alone. (Tr. 155; R. 529; Tr. 168; R. 542.) 
Mr. Warren also does not disclose that the stock valued at 
$45.75 on the day before the trial was purchased at less than 
one half of that value. (See, Defendant's Second Amended 
Answers to Interrogatories, R. 87.) 
Mr. Warren also inaccurately. states that his wife 
did not need alimony because she had a separate estate of 
almost $200,000. (Tr. 233; R. 607.) Mr. Warren must have 
known that this was an overvaluation of her estate as he 
admitted that he had prepared the taxe returns throughout the 
marriage and as a consequence would have to have known what 
her estate was and that he was aware of bank documents which 
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stated the value of the estate at $87,942. (Tr. 244; R, 
618.) 
c. The trial court abused its discretion o; 
ordering that Mrs. Warren pay a disproportionate amount 
- - - ~ 
the marital liabilities. 
The court adopted without modification the 
defendant's proposed division of marital liabilities set 
forth in defendant's Exhibit 33-D. Of the $16,238 in totai 
marital debts and obligations, Mrs. Warren was ordered to~' 
$11,634 or 72 percent. The testimony of both parties wut 
the effect that the majOri ty of the debts listed on Exhibit 
33-D were incurred prior to the separation of the partiu 
which occurred in August of 1979. (Tr. 89; R. 463; Tr. 23U 
R. 612.) 
In distributing the debts, the court apparentU 
failed to consider that Mrs. Warren's income was a fixed 
income from the principal of the trust and from alimony ana 
that reductions in principal of the tTust utilized to pay t! 
debts would reduce the amount of her monthly income. ~~I 
other hand, Mr. Warren had a significant monthly income d~ 
had grown consistently in the 26 years he had been with his 
employer and would in all likelihood continue to grow. 
(Tr. 238; R. 612.) The mistake made by the trial court in 
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its division of marital liabilities is most clearly pointed 
out by the ordering of Mrs. Warren to pay one-half of an 
income tax bill which totalled $5,207 when her income for the 
year of the tax liability, 1979, was approximately 1/6 of 
Mr. Warren's income. 
It has been found inequitable to award a party an 
interest in property but at the same time absolve them of any 
obligation to clear those debts which were created in the 
acquisition of the property. See, Allen v. Allen, 601 P.2d 
760 (Okla.App. 1979). 
It has been he-ld an abuse of discretion for the 
court to fail to consider the liabilities of the party and 
the burden that these liabilities have on each party. 
Certainly they must be considered in arriving at the net 
award to each party. In re Marriage of Metcalfe, 598 P.2d 
1140 (Mont. 1979). In Metcalfe, the court realized that the 
assumption of a debt would effectively reduce the marital 
estate awarded to one party. The court also recognized that 
the distribution of debt would make it difficult for one 
party to meet the obligations she had assumed. Certainly in 
the case before this court, a significant amount of the debt 
was ordered paid by that person with a fixed non-growth 
oriented income. The inequity of the debt distribution is 
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also made obvious by Mr. Warren's admissions of having UH: 
credit cards for his benefit or for the children. (Tr. 
183-186; R. 557-560.) 
D. The trial court abused its discretion i: 
awarding an insufficient amount of alimony for too limited. 
--.:. 
period of time. 
From Mr. Warren's demonstrated ability to acquir; 
significant monthly income, Mrs. Warren was awarded $400r 
month alimony for a 48 month period. The court specificaL 
found that Mr. Warren's net monthly take-home income was 
$1, 887. The court found that Mrs. Warren had an independen: 
source of income of an unspecified amount. Throughout tbe 
course of this litigation, Mr. Warren has taken the posttk 
that Mrs. Warren had a gross income from her trust of $800 
per month. (See, Defendant-respondant' s Motion for Summan 
Disposition; Tr. 205; R. 579.) With the $400 monthly 
alimony, Mr. Warren maintains that Mrs. Warren has a grou 
income of $1,200 per month. 
However, Mr. Warren fails to take into accou~ ~ 
Mrs. Warren's gross income is subject to taxes and that be 
will be receiving a substantial tax benefit from the 
deduction of the alimony payments. Consequently, the 
disparity of the monthly incomes is much more severe than 
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Mr. Warren will admit. Additionally, as Mrs. Warren must 
withdraw principal from her trust in order to pay obligations 
and in order to maintain the standard of living to which she 
has become accustomed, the amount of her gross monthly income 
will significantly decrease. 
This court has recently recognized those factors to 
be considered by an award of alimony. Gramme v. Gramme, 
587 P.2d 144 (Utah 1978). This court stated: 
The purpose of alimony is to provide 
post-marital support; it is intended 
neither as a penalty imposed on the 
husband nor as a reward granted to the 
wife. Its function is to provide support 
for the wife as nearly as possible at the 
standard of living she enjoyed during the 
marriage and to prevent her from becoming 
a public charge. Important criteria in 
determining a reasonable award for 
support and maintenance are the financial 
conditions and needs of the wife, 
considering her station in life; her 
ability to produce sufficient income for 
herself; and the ability of the husband 
to provide support. 
In the present case, and throughout the 29-year marriage, 
Mrs. Warren raised the parties' family and maintained the 
household, and as found by the court was never employed, has 
no skills and suffers a medical disability of her hands. 
During the marriage, Mr. Warren prospered in his career and 
developed a significant income which continued to grow after 
the dissolution of the marriage. Allowing Mr. Warren to take 
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from the marriage all marketable or liquid assets and P~ 
such a minimal amount of alimony can only be characterizec 
an enormous windfall to Mr. Warren. 
In light of the long duration of the marriage, i· 
Warren's demonstrated substantial income and continued iK 
potential, and the standard of living to which Mrs. hrm 
has grown accustomed during the marriage, the trial court': 
award of alimony in the amount of $400 per month for a 
limited four-year period must be said to be an abuse of 
discretion. These very factors have long been held ~ ~ 
court to be of signific&nce in determining the wife's 
entitlement to alimony. In Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79 
296 P.2d 977 (1956), the marriage had lasted 15 years and: 
principal issue on appeal was the appropriate amount ~ 
alimony to be awarded. This court held that in determinini 
alimony, 
[T]he court's responsibility is to 
endeavor to provide a just and equitable 
adjustment of [the parties'] economic 
resources so that the parties can 
reconstruct their lives on a happy and 
useful basis. In doing so it is 
necessary for the court to consider . · 
an appraisal of all of the attendant 
facts and circumstances: the duration of 
the marriage; the ages of the parties; 
their social positions and standards of 
living; their health; considerations 
relative to children; the money and 
property they possess and how it was 
24 
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acquired; and their capabilities and 
training and their present and potential 
incomes. 
296 P.2d at 979-80. Application of these factors in the 
present case renders inescapable the conclusion that the 
trial court abused its discretion in the alimony award. 
In English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977), it 
was held in connection with a 20-year marriage that: 
[T)he most important function of alimony 
is to provide support for the wife as 
nearly as possible at the standard of 
living she enjoyed during the marriage, 
and to prevent the wife from becoming a 
public charge. 
565 P.2d at 411. 
In Frank v. Frank, 585 P.2d 453 (Utah 1978), in 
response to questions over an alimony award, the court 
observed: 
How the defenant, or anyone on his 
behalf, could even suggest that a wife 
who had devoted 21 years to her marriage 
and reared a family should be turned out 
to subsist on her own is as discordant to 
our sense of justice as it was to the 
trial judge. 
585 P.2d at 455. 
During this marriage, Mr. Warren's salary has 
significantly increased. Utilizing both that income and 
depleting Mrs. Warren's legacy, the parties have acquired a 
significant marital estate. Mr. Warren has received a great 
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amount of benefit by the use of Mrs. Warren's legacy 
receiving luxuries in life such as three sports cars. ~ 
would now ask the court to force Mrs. Warren to live off 
severely depleted legacy and on an insufficient amount oi 
alimony while he takes from the marriage any property tha• 
will provide an income in the future. 
In Tremayne v. Tremayne, 116 Utah 483, 211 P.2d. 
(1949), the court addressed the matter of the distributioc 
property as follows: 
Through schooling, appellant's earning 
capacity has been substantially increased 
during the ma-rriage. And respondent's 
earning capacity has not been 
proportionally increased during that 
time. To make this schooling and their 
savings possible, she worked practically 
throughout their married life. Without 
her working the bulk of the property 
which they have, would not have been 
accumulated, and he probably could not 
have accumulated it had he been single 
and had he followed the same course which 
he did. How far either one would have 
gone without the other is largely a 
matter of conjecture. 
211 P.2d at 454 (numerous citations omitted). This languai• 
is directly applicable to the circumstances of this case fc: 
Mr. Warren's schooling was provided by Mrs. Warren's legac: 
and the marriage was supported by that legacy in its early 
years. Substantial portions of her income were paid to 
support the marriage on a day-to-day basis as well as W 
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provide it with the luxuries of life, freeing Mr. Warren's 
income and permitting the acquisition of large amounts of 
stock. (Tr. 153; R. 527.) Under these circumstances, the 
alimony award is inadequate and inequitable. 
E. The trial court abused its discretion in 
failing to award to Mrs. Warren any attorney's fees. 
Mrs. Warren testified that she desired the court 
award her reasonable attorney's fees incurred in connection 
with this action. (Tr. 94; R. 468). However, the court in 
its memorandum decision stated "no evidence having been 
presented as to attornef's fees, none are awarded." 
Mrs. Warren was ordered to pay a substantial 
manjority of the debts of the parties and was left with a 
decreasing income. Mr. Warren's income at the time of the 
decree of divorce was approximately six times as great as 
Mrs. Warren's. In such circumstances, this court has 
repeatedly held that an award of attorney's fees to the wife 
is appropriate. For example, in Alldredge v. Alldredge, 
119 Utah 504, 229 P.2d 681 (1951), it was pointed out that 
this Court had traditionally adhered to the policy that: 
The awarding of counsel fees as well 
as alimony was in the discretion of 
the trial court, and that a finding of 
the trial court would not be set aside 
in the absence of an abuse of such 
discretion ••.. 
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It was error for the court to deny the 
[wife] counsel fees which are a part of 
her costs pendente lite and which could 
have ben required before the suit was 
concluded. 
229 P.2d at 686-87. 
The trial court's failure to award attorney's fe, 
to the wife was, likewise, reversed in Christensen v. 
Christensen, 18 Utah 2d 315, 422 P.2d 534 (1967); and 
Griffiths v. Griffiths, 3 Utah 2d 82, 278 P.2d 983 (1955), 
The trial court's failure to award attorney's~ 
can only be justified by the misapprehension that the 
property settlement favors Mrs. Warren. Once this 
misapprehension is dispelled, Mr. Warren's argument must 
evaporate along with it. 
Mrs. Warren's trial counsel withdrew following to' 
entry of the decree of divorce and in early January 1980 
filed a civil action against her to recover those attorney'; 
fees which she had incurred in the approximate sum of $7,00i 
Robinson and Wells, P. C. v. Barbara J. Warren, Third Judici0 
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Civil~. 
C-81-14. The trial court's failure to award the attorney's 
fees was but an additional burden upon Mrs. Warren which, 
like the other debts she was ordered to pay, will 
substantially reduce her monthly income. 
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CONCLUSION 
Whether reviewed in part or in total, the decree of 
divorce fashioned by the trial court deprives Mrs. Warren of 
any meaningful benefit of the estate acquired by these 
parties during their 29-year marriage. Mrs. Warren takes 
from the marriage, only that which she brought to it. 
Mr. Warren does not dispute that Mrs. Warren's substantial 
legacy was utilized to a great extent to support the marriage 
and it is undisputed that the legacy returned to her by the 
decree of divorce is in no way capable of producing the 
income necessary to maintain the standard of living to which 
Mrs. Warren had grown accustomed. At the same time, when one 
considers the property awarded to the husband, it becomes 
clear that he leaves the marriage with a windfall with a 
substantial income and substantial income-producing stock. 
It must be kept in mind that Mrs. Warren's legacy supported 
the marriage, making possible the investments which 
Mr. Warren now takes from the marriage. 
The decree of divorce fashioned by the trial court 
does abuse that court's discretion in the area of marital 
liabilities, for that party least able to pay was ordered to 
assume 72 percent of the marital obligations. The only 
reasonable source to satisfy these obligations, Mrs. Warren's 
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legacy, will be reduced and in turn so will Mrs. Warren's 
monthly income. This same argument is true with respect t 
the f ai 1 ure of the trial court to award any attorney's fee; 
Mr. Warren's substantial income and substantial assets re[i. 
untouched, while Mrs. Warren must further deplete that leg• 
which is to provide her with support for the rest of her 
life. 
The alimony awarded to Mrs. Warren, $400 per mont: 
for a 48-mon th period, is a clear abuse of the trial court'· 
discretion when viewed in light of the nature of the proper 
awarded to Mr. Warren as well as his present income. T~ 
trial court clearly misunderstood the evidence of 
Mrs. Warren's ability to support herself and that of 
Mr. Warren to provide for her. The decree of divorce U 
based upon a comparison of Mr. Warren's net income without 
consideration of the tax benefit from the payment of tl~~ 
to Mrs. Warren's gross income prior to the satisfaction of 
tax liabilities. Also, the court failed to take into~~ 
the decrease in the monthly income from Mrs. Warren's lega1 
due to the burdening of her by the marital obligations aod 
her own attorney's fees. 
Plaintiff-appellant requests this court reverse:: 
decree of divorce entered by the trial court and either 
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remand this action for a new trial or fashion an equitable 
and just decree. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27 day of July, 1981. 
Paul H. Proctor 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this~ day of July, 1981, I 
placed with "The Runner--Service" two copies of the foregoing 
Appellant's brief to be delivered to Nicolaas de Jonge, 
attorney for defendant-respondent, Suite 14, Intrade 
Building, 1399 South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84105. 
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